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BOOKS
BOOK REVIEW
A DISSENTING LAWYER'S LnFE. By Thurman
Arnold. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1965. Pp. xi,
292. $5.95.

FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL:

"In spite of its imperfections and its aspects of high comedy," writes
Thurman Arnold, "there is no career in the world more interesting than
the law in the United States. You have an orchestra seat from which to
observe the most fascinating spectacles" (p. 270). He sees Harvard
busily buying books and just as busily giving scholarships to make sure
the books are read, Yale trying to make law a behavioral science, lesser
law schools trying to imitate one or the other, law firms with hundreds
of lawyers working day and night to find cases to include in their briefs
and "thus confuse the courts," judges and their law clerks in turn working just as hard to avoid being confused, Establishment high priests
stamping the imprimatur of orthodoxy on things political and economic
while castigating all other thinking as "unsound," Madison Avenue's
P.R. men making the images of our political leaders, and scientists
("the only knowledgeable hard workers in the lot") devising means
by which we can destroy ourselves and civilization (pp. 270-71). And
he sees another fascinating spectacle -Thurman Arnold dressed in
"striped pants" and "a high silk hat," passing in life's review (p. vii).
As he watches himself go by, he attempts to record and understand his
role in the human venture.
If one knows anything about Thurman Arnold, the prospect of reading his autobiography is inviting. Irreverent legal realist, former Yale
professor, author of two brilliant books,- chief of the antitrust division
of the Department of Justice in the latter days of the New Deal, exjudge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and
friend and former associate of Justices Douglas and Fortas-these
are the marks of a man about whom we should like to know a great
deal. Thus for those who are familiar with his writings and want to
understand the man in depth, his prefatory comment that writing auto' ARNOLD,
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biography is "much like dressing yourself in striped pants, putting
on a high silk hat, and watching yourself go by" is disconcerting, for
it symbolizes formality and gives rise to the suspicion that when it
comes to certain subjects, such as aspects of his personal life affecting
his official conduct, Arnold will hide behind his stiff white shirt front
and black tie. To a large extent the suspicion is justified. Arnold
speaks of his youth with some candor, though the recollections of that
period are intended to amuse as much as to enlighten, but as he approaches his important official years, he becomes more and more distant
as a person, and the focus of the book shifts from Arnold's life to
Arnold's views about life.
For those who expected the confessions of a legal realist, the shift is
disappointing. Yet the book remains interesting to the end, mostly
because it discusses and illustrates Arnold's major original insight-the
significance of the symbolic aspects of law and politics - something
political scientists and sociologists are just beginning to study systematically.2 It may not have been by design, but no matter what Arnold
discusses, he soon taps its symbolic dimension. Here are a couple of
examples. Although he thinks the NRA was economic nonsense, he
recognizes its symbolic importance, for President Roosevelt used it as
"an instrument that gave the people hope and courage. When it ceased
to do that, Roosevelt turned to other means" (p. 146). In regard to
the Supreme Court, Arnold believes that the legal realists of the 1930's,
himself included, did yeoman service in exposing the psychology that
lies behind the facade of legal logic, but he concedes that "legal realism
is not effective in giving to our legal institutions the public respect required to symbolize the great ideal of a rule of law above men" (p. 70).
The Court today, he says, is dramatizing the ideals of due process and
equality, and because it has been fairly successful in symbolizing these
values, it has retained public respect and hence political power.
In symbolic terms, the most important position Arnold held was U. S.
Court of Appeals judge. At the time of his appointment, it was his
intention to spend the rest of his years on the bench. The chapter dealing with his judicial period is surprisingly short-less than four pages,
half of which have little to do with Judge Arnold. Further, for some
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reason not directly disclosed in the text, those pages seem to have been
written with tongue in cheek. Why did Arnold resign from the Court
of Appeals? His answer is that he felt that he was by temperament
more of an advocate than a judge, that the judicial role did not satisfy
him, that he was impatient with legal precedents that reached unjust
results, and that he felt restricted in being unable to speak out on
controversial subjects. This is a plausible explanation, but one wonders
whether there might still be more to it than that. Although Jerome
Frank was able to adjust to the bench, it seems incongruous for a legal
realist to take the robe without compromising his position; it is almost
like an unbeliever taking holy orders. A legal realist at the bar is
another matter; there his realism contributes to success in the profession. Unlike the judge, he can quip, as Arnold impishly did in his
Playboy brief: "The only way to avoid such repellent descriptions is to
hold that no nudes is good nudes" (p. 184).
Fair Fights and Foul was published just before Abe FortasArnold's law partner and one of the persons to whom the book is dedicated-was appointed to the Supreme Court. A number of cases in
which Fortas was counsel-such as Lattimore, Durham, and Gideonare discussed, but no clear picture of Fortas' personality or value system emerges. The impression Arnold gives, however, is that he and
Fortas were in substantial agreement concerning most social and
political issues. In view of Fortas' elevation to the High Court, it is
unfortunate that Arnold did not write in greater detail about his partner. There is, of course, still time to do so.
Thurman Arnold's memoir is delightful, informative, and interesting; it whets the appetite for more. And there is more to be said, a
great deal more. But to say it Arnold will have to take off the high silk
hat and striped trousers. Perhaps it is too much to ask for the candor
of Rousseau, Norris, Gide, or Augustine. Many would settle for a good
deal less-what Arnold himself would have settled for when he and
Edwin Robinson taught their course at Yale on the psychological basis
of law.'
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